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I. INTRODUCTION
Michelle and Sarah are social workers in North Carolina who fell in love
in 2004 and have been a committed couple ever since.1 In 2007, they
decided to have a baby.2 Michelle became pregnant via artificial
insemination and their son Thomas (named for Sarah’s beloved
grandfather) was born in 2008.3 Since same-sex marriage is not a legal
option in North Carolina (and even if it were, it would only provide a
presumption of legal parenthood for Sarah), Michelle and Sarah began
discussing ways that Sarah could legally formalize her status as Thomas’s
mother.4 They discovered second-parent adoption, and decided to wait
until their family was complete before undertaking the somewhat costly
process.5 Two years later, in 2010, Michelle gave birth to Thomas’s
younger sister Lottie.6 In December 2010, before Sarah completed the

1. See E-mail from Michelle, biological mother of Thomas and Lottie, to Susanna
Birdsong (Jan. 14, 2012, 10:08 EST) (on file with author) (all names have been
changed to protect privacy).
2. See id. (including in-depth discussions of who would become pregnant,
preferred parenting methods, and maternity care insurance decisions).
3. See id. (highlighting their intention to raise a child that was connected to both
parents in name, even if it was impossible for him to be connected biologically).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2011) (stating that any type of marriage,
including common law marriage, between same-sex couples is not legally recognized
in the state); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT
FAMILIES 1 (2011) (noting that although legally married adults are both presumed to be
parents when they have a child, that presumption does not apply to same-sex couples
who are not recognized as married or in a civil union or domestic partnership).
5. See NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 2 (defining secondparent adoption as the legal procedure that the non-biological parent uses to adopt his
or her partner’s child without terminating the partner’s parental rights).
6. See E-mail from Michelle, supra note 1 (noting that at this point, their family
was complete).
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adoption process and finalized a legal relationship with her children, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Boseman v. Jarrell, voided a finalized
second-parent adoption.7 This denied future access to the second-parent
adoption process in the state, absent legislative action.8 North Carolina
stands alone as the only state in the country that has retroactively voided a
final second-parent adoption on subject matter jurisdictional grounds,
although it is now one of several states that deny access to the process
prospectively.9
This Comment argues that North Carolina erred when it voided a final
second-parent adoption on subject matter jurisdictional grounds, and
further advocates that the state should allow second-parent adoptions using
the well-established “best interests of the child” standard.10 Part II
examines the state-specific evolution of second-parent adoption law.11 Part
II also identifies and explains the historic jurisdictional deference that state
courts are afforded in the adoption arena and contrasts second-parent
adoptions that have been challenged on subject matter jurisdictional
grounds in various states.12 Part III argues that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina wrongly stripped lower courts of the ability to hear second-parent
adoption cases, contradicting the state’s adoption statutes and decades of
jurisprudence on subject matter jurisdiction.13 Part III further advocates
that the North Carolina General Assembly should act to repudiate the
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision and clarify its adoption
statutes by explicitly permitting second-parent adoptions using the
established best interests of the child standard as a rationale for the
7. See Boseman v. Jarrell (Boseman II), 704 S.E.2d 494, 496 (N.C. 2010) (holding
that North Carolina courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant secondparent adoptions, thus voiding such adoptions ab initio (from the beginning)).
8. See id. (stating recognition of second-parent adoption must be granted by the
North Carolina General Assembly).
9. See NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 3-4 (highlighting that as
a general rule, courts have recognized that a final adoption cannot be challenged
because of the importance of permanence and stability for families).
10. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 505-10 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“[A] majority
of this Court acts contrary to explicit statutory language and legislative intent in order
to achieve this outcome.”); Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent
Adoptions: On Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the
Child, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1028-29 (1999) (observing that a second-parent
adoption might be in the best interest of the child because it would guarantee financial
and emotional security).
11. See infra Part II (surveying existing second-parent adoption statutes and case
law in the United States).
12. See infra Part II (explaining the source of subject matter jurisdiction and
contrasting North Carolina’s treatment of it in the adoption arena with other states that
have ruled on second-parent adoption subject matter jurisdiction challenges).
13. See infra Part III (arguing that the court read the statutory language without
considering the overarching statutory purposes of protecting the best interests of the
child and ensuring finality in adoption decisions).
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change.14 Part IV suggests that in amending state adoption statutes to allow
for second-parent adoption, the legislature would act in the best interests of
society as well as the child.15 Finally, Part V concludes that by stripping
the state’s lower courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear second-parent
adoption cases, the Supreme Court of North Carolina erred as a matter of
law and public policy and the legislature should act to remedy the court’s
error.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Second-Parent Adoption in the States
The institution of adoption is strictly a creation of statute, with the
primary purpose of “creat[ing] a legal connection between an adoptive
parent and child who are not biologically related, thereby conferring on
each legal rights and obligations that did not previously exist between
them.”17 As a general rule, before a child can be adopted, the parental
rights of the child’s biological parents must be terminated.18 Most states
recognize one exception to this ‘cut-off’ provision: a stepparent’s ability to
adopt his or her spouse’s child without necessitating a termination of the
remaining parent’s parental rights.19
Another exception that has gained attention in the last two decades,
called second-parent adoption, is seen as an extension of the stepparent
exception, and allows a same-sex partner to adopt his or her partner’s
biological child without a termination of the biological parent’s parental
rights.20 While only four states currently have statutes that expressly
permit second-parent adoptions,21 second-parent adoptions have been
14. See infra Part III (suggesting that the North Carolina General Assembly should
overturn the North Carolina supreme court’s decision in Boseman v. Jarrell).
15. See infra Part IV (discussing social science research that the General Assembly
should use in its reasoning).
16. See infra Part V (concluding that the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s
decision in Boseman v. Jarrell employed circular reasoning and myopic vision when it
deprived state courts of subject matter jurisdiction and families of security).
17. See In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2002) (defining
adoption as purely a statutory right, unknown at common law).
18. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-106(c) (2011) (stating that an adoption decree
dissolves the parent-child legal relationship between the adoptee and his or her
biological or former adoptive parents).
19. See, e.g., id. § 48-1-106(d) (clarifying that an adoption by a stepparent does not
have any effect on the relationship between the child and the parent who is the
stepparent’s spouse).
20. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993)
(concluding that the state legislature did not intend that a biological parent’s rights
should be terminated when that parent is a party to the adoption petition).
21. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2011) (stating that a domestic partner
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legitimized in many other states at common law. To date, eighteen states
and the District of Columbia have allowed the option of second-parent
adoption for same-sex couples statewide, while in another eight states,
same-sex couples have successfully petitioned for second-parent adoption
in some jurisdictions.22 Since there are only a handful of states that permit
same-sex marriage or formalized domestic partnership options that would
create a presumption of parenthood for both partners, second-parent
adoptions remain one of the only avenues in many states for gay and
lesbian couples to secure their family ties.23
B. The Best Interests of the Child Standard
The best interests of the child standard was born out of child custody
disputes and places primary emphasis on what is best for the child at issue
rather than for his or her parents.24 The standard gives a judge wide
latitude in a custody dispute to resolve what is best for a child, allowing for
the consideration of factors such as the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional well-being.25 The state’s interest in promoting the best outcomes
for children is apparent not only in judicial decisions, but in legislative
language as well; many state adoption statutes use language that reflects the
best interests of the child standard and its ideals.26 Thus, courts use
statutory language incorporating the best interests of the child standard
when reviewing and granting second-parent adoptions, drawing on it to
justify granting or maintaining such adoptions, even though they are not
specifically conceived of in the statutes.27
can petition to adopt his or her partner’s child in the county of residence); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-5-203 (2011) (recognizing a second-parent adoption after written and
verified consent by the sole legal parent); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(3) (2011)
(stating that a parent may agree to an adoption, in writing, with one other person who
shares parental responsibility for the child); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (West
2010) (including specific language regarding an adoption by a “parent’s partner”).
22. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS: SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
(2011), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/images/general/2nd_Parent_Adoption.pdf
(reporting the latest state by state statistics on the approval of second-parent adoptions).
23. See Patricia M. Logue, The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their
Children, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 95, 96 (2002) (noting the advancements in
increasing security of parent-child relationships notwithstanding the parent’s sexual
orientation).
24. See LINDA ELROD, Finding the Best Interests of the Child, CHILD CUSTODY
PRAC. & PROC. § 4:1 (2012) (stating that the welfare of a child is an important state
interest that a state has a duty to protect by assessing the best interests of the child).
25. See id. (explaining that the standard allows for fact-finding that tries to predict
the most successful outcomes for a child).
26. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(b)(1) (2011) (stating that the main
purpose of the adoption statutes is to “advance the welfare of minors . . . by facilitating
the adoption of minors in need of adoptive placement by persons who can give them
love, care, security, and support”).
27. See, e.g., Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. App. 2007)
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C. Adoption and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Adoption matters fall squarely within the purview of state courts,
creating a jurisdictional patchwork of statutory interpretation and court
decisions that form a visible pattern.28 The majority of courts that have
considered second-parent adoption cases have construed the adoption
statutes to allow for the possibility of second-parent adoption.29 In states
that have denied second-parent adoptions, all have employed strict
construction of adoption statutes to hold that, other than an exception for a
stepparent, an unrelated person cannot adopt a child without first
terminating that child’s legal relationship with his or her biological
parents.30
At the appellate level, several second-parent adoptions in various states
have been challenged on subject matter jurisdictional grounds.31 A
challenge based on subject matter jurisdiction goes to the validity of the
adoption from the start, and attempts to void the adoption based on the
court’s lack of authority to grant it.32 Challenges of this nature are
distinguishable from appeals, which dispute a court’s conclusions of law

(noting that the district court granted a second-parent adoption in part because it was in
the best interests of the child).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289 (1971) (emphasizing
that in determining when to grant a proposed adoption, a court applies the local law).
29. See Jason N.W. Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption Is the Second-Best
Option: The Case for Legislative Reform as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples
in the Face of Continued Marriage Inequality, 11 SCHOLAR 57, 67-69 (2008)
(highlighting that courts usually employ liberal construction of statutes and analyze
legislative intent in deciding the legitimacy of second-parent adoptions).
30. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Neb. 2002) (holding
that a same-sex partner could not adopt a child who had not been legally relinquished
by his biological parent first); In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (finding that the trial court did not err in holding that the
biological mother’s parental rights would terminate upon adoption of the child by a
non-stepparent); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Wis. 1994) (holding that
because the biological mother’s parental rights remain intact, the child was not eligible
to be adopted by her mother’s partner).
31. See Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Iowa 2008) (determining that the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the adoptions at issue, so even if
the lower court misinterpreted the statute, the adoptions could not be voided); Hansen
v. McClellan, No. 269618, 2006 WL 3524059, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2006) (per
curiam) (confirming the subject matter jurisdiction of a trial court that granted a
second-parent adoption, despite the court’s potential error in interpreting the adoption
statutes); Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 752 (noting that it would be “inequitable and
unconscionable” to allow a parent to use the court system to both grant and then
destroy an adoption); In re Paternity of Christian R. H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2010) (holding the trial court that granted second-parent adoption erred as matter
of law, but refusing to void decision despite error, citing the importance of final
judgment).
32. See, e.g., Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d 494, 498 (N.C. 2010) (holding that because
the adoption court granted an adoption not recognized by the adoption statutes, the
adoption court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the adoption decree).
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rather than attempting to render it completely unable to act.33 Jurisdictional
challenges to final adoptions are considered options of last resort, when the
challenger has neglected to file a timely appeal.34 All challenges to secondparent adoptions based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction have failed,
with one exception—the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in
Boseman v. Jarrell.35 Courts that have denied these jurisdictional
challenges have done so out of deference to the broad jurisdiction of lower
courts as well as out of consideration for the best interests of the child.36
Traditionally, when a state court is deciding a matter that is similar or
identical to issues previously decided by other state courts, opinions from
other states are considered influential and persuasive, especially when a
state court considers making a decision that is contrary to other state
courts’ interpretations of law and policy.37
State courts are considered courts of general jurisdiction, and are able to
“adjudicate any justiciable controversy that is not exclusively consigned to
some other tribunal.”38 As a general rule, state courts that have jurisdiction
over traditional adoption cases also have jurisdiction over second-parent
adoptions.39 A state court’s subject matter jurisdiction is defined either by
state constitution or by statute, and regardless of the defining source is
often a broad grant of jurisdiction.40 Many state courts, including the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, have noted that a trial court cannot be
divested of subject matter jurisdiction because of a malfunction in
33. See, e.g., Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 748 (noting that even if a judgment was
based on an erroneous reading of the statutes, that type of error would not deprive the
district court of jurisdiction and would not make the decree void).
34. See, e.g., Schott, 744 N.W.2d at 88-89 (pointing out that final adoption orders
are only vulnerable to attack after the timeframe for appeals has run in cases involving
jurisdictional or due process issues).
35. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 496 (holding the adoption decree at issue void
ab initio).
36. See Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 748 (holding that a lower court maintained subject
matter jurisdiction over second-parent adoptions and that even if the lower court erred
as a matter of law, the adoption should be undisturbed because that was best for the
child at issue).
37. See State v. Warren, 114 S.E.2d 660, 666 (N.C. 1960) (displaying the relevance
of other state court decisions when a North Carolina court’s decision on a matter would
be contrary to all others).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (2001) (contrasting the
general jurisdiction of state courts with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts).
39. See Mark A. Momjian, Annotation, Cause of Action for Second-Parent
Adoption, 25 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 1, § 38 (2011) (discussing general adoption
jurisdictional issues).
40. Compare WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (stating that state courts have original
jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters within the state, except as provided by
statute), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-100(b) (2011) (broadly defining the boundaries
for a state court’s subject matter jurisdiction over adoption cases by requiring only
minimal residency requirements of the parties).
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following proper procedure or even because of an error of law.41 Further,
the modern trend is to “reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack
on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”42 This
reduction of vulnerability is especially important in adoption cases, where
the best interests of the child often involve finality and stability.43
D. Second-Parent Adoption in North Carolina: Boseman v. Jarrell
Although the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in Boseman v.
Jarrell differed dramatically from other courts that have decided secondparent adoption cases on subject matter jurisdictional grounds, the facts of
the cases at issue in North Carolina and other states remain strikingly
similar.44 Julia Boseman was the state’s first openly gay legislator, and her
partner, Melissa Jarrell, was a university athletics coach.45 They decided to
have a child together, and Jarrell became pregnant via artificial
insemination in 2002.46 In 2005, a district court in Durham, North Carolina
entered an adoption decree that made Boseman a legal parent of their son
Jacob without terminating Jarrell’s parental rights.47 The adoption petition
was made with Jarrell’s full knowledge and consent.48 The next year, the
couple ceased their relationship and Jarrell attacked the final adoption

41. See, e.g., Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d 494, 507 (N.C. 2010) (Hudson, J., dissenting)
(“[W]hen the parties are voluntarily before the [c]ourt, and . . . a judgment is entered in
favor of one party against another, such judgment is valid, although not granted
according to the orderly course of procedure.” (quoting Peoples v. Norwood, 94 N.C.
167, 172 (1886))).
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e (2001) (further noting
that the cost of scrutinizing the subject matter jurisdiction of lower courts is increased
vulnerability to interruption and post-judgment attack).
43. See Linda D. Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for
Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245, 250-52 (2011) [hereinafter Elrod, A
Child’s Perspective] (noting that continuity, including the legal designation of parents,
is essential to a child’s overall well-being).
44. Compare Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 497-98 (involving a lesbian couple’s
custody battle and a biological mother’s argument that her former partner’s adoption of
the child at issue should be voided as contravening the adoption statutes of the state),
with In re Paternity of Christian R. H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 231-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)
(illustrating a very similar factual background and argument in a dispute over a
parentage order).
45. See Lydia E. Lavelle, North Carolina’s Continuing Assignment of
Responsibility for Its Children: Boseman v. Jarrell, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 479, 480
(2010) (describing the facts of the case and the beginnings of Boseman and Jarrell’s
relationship).
46. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 497 (noting that the parties decided that Jarrell
would actually bear the child, but “both parties would otherwise jointly participate in
the conception process”).
47. See id. (finding that the adoption court did not comply with statutory
requirements by not terminating Jarrell’s parental rights while simultaneously granting
parental rights to Boseman).
48. See id. (relying on information that the parties sought the adoption together).
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decree, claiming that the Durham district court did not have jurisdiction to
grant the adoption in the first place.49 Although the Supreme Court
maintained Boseman’s relationship with Jacob by granting her custody
rights, it held that her adoption of Jacob, and thus her status as his legal
parent, was void ab initio.50 The court reasoned that based on the language
provided in the state’s adoption statutes, the lower court never had subject
matter jurisdiction to grant the adoption in the first place; thus, Jarrell’s
collateral assault on Boseman’s adoption was allowed even though she
failed to file a timely appeal.51 In finding for Jarrell and reversing the
opinion of the court of appeals below, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
became the first state court to void a final second-parent adoption based on
a lower court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.52
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court of North Carolina Erred in Stripping Lower Courts
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the Area of Second-Parent Adoptions
Because a Trial Court Granting a Second-Parent Adoption in North
Carolina at Most Commits an Error of Law.
When the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that state courts do not
have subject matter jurisdiction to decide second-parent adoption cases, the
court failed to appreciate the broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction
afforded to lower courts deciding adoption matters in the state.53 In
Boseman v. Jarrell, the court overstepped its bounds by stripping the lower
court of subject matter jurisdiction rather than finding, at most, that the
lower court erred as a matter of law.54 Statutorily, for jurisdiction over
49. See id. at 498 (describing the beginnings of a bitter custody battle that included
Jarrell trying to preclude Boseman’s petition for custody by claiming that the adoption
was invalid).
50. See id. at 504 (holding that Boseman retained custody rights because Jarrell
acted inconsistently with her parental rights by ceding decision-making authority for
her son).
51. See id. at 496 (holding that because the General Assembly did not provide
North Carolina courts with subject matter jurisdiction to create the type of adoption
procured by Boseman and Jarrell, the adoption decree was void ab initio).
52. See id. at 500-01 (noting that lower courts do not have the power to issue
modified adoption decrees, and rather must adhere strictly to the provisions of the
statute).
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-100 (2011) (granting subject matter jurisdiction
over adoption cases to North Carolina courts, with the only prerequisite that parties be
domiciled in the state for a particular length of time or that an agency licensed by the
state or county have legal custody of the adoptee).
54. See Ellis v. Ellis, 130 S.E. 7, 9 (N.C. 1925) (citing the well-known principle
that when a court has jurisdiction over the subject before it, “the binding force and
effect of a judgment is not impaired because the same has been erroneously allowed,
though the error may be undoubted and apparent on the face of the record”).
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adoption cases to attach, parties seeking adoptions in North Carolina must
meet only one of two residency requirements; yet the Supreme Court read
in an additional requirement that to maintain subject matter jurisdiction, a
lower court must not allow the parties before it to waive statutory
provisions pertaining to the complete severing of biological parental ties.55
By finding that a court presiding over an adoption steps out of its
jurisdictional bounds when it waives certain statutory provisions and enters
an adoption order, the court introduced a new interpretation of subject
matter jurisdiction that rejected the statutory language and decades of
precedent.56
A narrow and literal interpretation of the state’s adoption statutes should
have resulted in the Supreme Court, at most, ruling that the lower court
erred as a matter of law by granting a second-parent adoption, because such
an adoption scheme is not conceived of specifically in the statutes.57 This
holding would have enabled the lower court’s ruling to be overturned on
timely appeal, while respecting the traditional province of the lower courts
to enforce the statutes and grant adoption decrees.58
Because errors of law are voidable but not void, in order for this
potential error of law to have been substantively reviewed and possibly
overturned, Jarrell should have appealed the final adoption decree within
the timeframe allotted by the statute.59 Since Jarrell challenged the
adoption almost two years after its finalization, instead of appealing within
thirty days of the final decree as required by statute, the Supreme Court
should have rejected her challenge.60 Instead, the Supreme Court allowed a
collateral challenge to a final adoption order, trampling the jurisdictional
55. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-100 (2011) (requiring only that parties be
domiciled in the state for six months—or in the case of infant adoptees, from birth—
before jurisdiction attaches over adoption matters); see also Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d
494, 506 (N.C. 2010) (Hudson, J., dissenting) (noting that if the General Assembly had
intended such an additional requirement, it would have included it in the ‘Jurisdiction’
section of the statute).
56. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 506 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“[T]his new
approach to subject matter jurisdiction—to ignore statutory requisites and instead
create our own—runs counter to the language of N.C.G.S. § 48-2-100, and decades of
jurisprudence on subject matter jurisdiction.”).
57. See id. (declaring that if the trial court was not authorized to issue a secondparent adoption, the most its adoption decree could amount to is an error of law, and it
would only be subject to challenge within the statutory time limits for appeal).
58. See Ellis, 130 S.E. at 9 (basing its holding on the principle that a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be stripped because its judgment was in error).
59. See Ottway Burton, P.A. v. Blanton, 421 S.E.2d 381, 383 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that judgments in error may be corrected only by appeal).
60. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-607(b) (defining the parameters of final adoption
appeal); see also Boseman v. Jarrell (Boseman I), 681 S.E.2d 374, 378 (N.C. Ct. App.
2009) (noting that Jarrell failed to meet the requirements for an appeal, and further
holding that the adoption decree was merely voidable and not void), aff’d in part as
modified, rev’d in part, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010).
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territory of the lower court as well as the rights of an adoptive parent and
child.61 The court should have allowed Jarrell’s attempt to circumvent the
traditional adoption appeals process to fail, and in doing so should have
highlighted that finality and stability in adoption cases are in the best
interests of the child.62
B. The Supreme Court of North Carolina Should Have Considered Other
State Precedents Regarding Adoption and Subject Matter Jurisdiction as
Highly Persuasive Authority Because the Court Stands Alone as the Only
Court in Any Jurisdiction That Has Retroactively Stripped Lower Courts of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Decide Second-Parent Adoption Cases.
Numerous decisions from other states have rejected challenges to a
court’s subject matter jurisdiction in second-parent adoption cases, and the
Supreme Court of North Carolina should have considered such decisions as
highly persuasive authority.63 Although a state court in North Carolina is
not bound by the decisions rendered in any other state, if other state courts
have decided a similar issue, their analyses should be considered
informative to a North Carolina court deciding a comparable case.64 This is
especially true when a state court’s decision on a similar matter would
stand out as contrary to the decisions of all other courts in other
jurisdictions, as does the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in
Boseman v. Jarrell.65 To date, North Carolina stands alone as the only state
that has stripped its courts of the ability to preside over second-parent
adoptions.66
61. See Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 547 S.E.2d 127, 130 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that a court’s subject matter jurisdiction “is not to be confused with the way in
which that power may be exercised in order to comply with the terms of the
statute . . . .”); see also Lavelle, supra note 45, at 481 (discussing the policy rationales
for upholding the adoption, including the interests and rights of the minor child).
62. See New Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 25, Boseman v. Jarrell (Boseman II),
704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010) (No. 416PA08-2) (emphasizing that allowing Jarrell’s
collateral attack to proceed disregards the importance of the finality of judgments).
63. See, e.g., Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. App. 2007)
(holding that a mother’s challenge to her former partner’s adoption of their child was
not made within the limits of appeal, and an attack on the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction was without merit); see also State v. Warren, 114 S.E.2d 660, 666 (N.C.
1960) (stating that the North Carolina supreme court was not bound by the decisions of
other state courts, but highlighting that if many other state courts had decided the same
issue, their judgments should be considered “highly persuasive”).
64. See, e.g., State v. Mbacke, 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (N.C. 2012) (bolstering its
rationale by pointing out similar conclusions reached by other state courts (citing
Warren, 114 S.E.2d at 666)).
65. See Warren, 114 S.E.2d at 666 (noting that decisions from other states become
highly relevant when North Carolina’s decision on a matter would be contrary to all
others).
66. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d 494, 496 (N.C. 2010) (holding that because the
General Assembly did not vest state courts with subject matter jurisdiction to create
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina should have considered recent
decisions from other states especially relevant as it considered Boseman v.
Jarrell.67 A Wisconsin appellate court recently held that although secondparent adoption was long ago rejected as a legitimate option under
Wisconsin’s adoption statutes, a trial court’s grant of parentage status to a
biological mother’s lesbian partner was final and out of the court’s reach to
overturn, due to the lack of a timely appeal.68 The appellate court ruled in
the interest of stability for the child and finality of the judgment, even
though it found that the lower court definitively erred by “reaching beyond
the statutes to construct its own basis for conferring parental rights.”69 The
Wisconsin court’s description regarding the finality of second-parent
adoptions as a balancing act between “the judiciary’s interest in achieving
fair resolutions of disputes and the policy favoring finality of judgments” is
noteworthy and pertinent to decisions regarding the finality of secondparent adoptions in any state.70
Additionally, the Supreme Court of North Carolina should have
considered the rationale of an appellate court in Texas that denied a subject
matter jurisdictional challenge and upheld a second-parent adoption even
after assuming the lower court erred as matter of law, ruling in favor of
strict adherence to the statutory appeals process.71 The Texas court also
employed judicial estoppel in precluding the challenge to a final adoption
decree by noting that “[i]t would be inequitable and unconscionable to
allow Goodson to invoke the jurisdiction of a court for the sole purpose of
creating a parent-child relationship between Castellanos and K.G. and then
subsequently allow her to destroy that same relationship because her

second-parent adoptions, the adoption decree was void ab initio).
67. Compare id. with In re Paternity of Christian R. H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 236 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2010) (noting that although the Wisconsin court held that second-parent
adoptions were not allowable by statute, it further held that the biological parent had
not filed an appeal in the timeframe permitted, therefore allowing the final adoption
and the lower court’s error of law to stand).
68. See In re Paternity of Christian R. H., 794 N.W.2d at 234; see also In re
Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Wis. 1994) (denying a second-parent
adoption and holding that a minor is not eligible for adoption unless the parental rights
of both biological parents have been terminated).
69. See In re Paternity of Christian R.H., 794 N.W.2d at 234 (finding that the
lower court’s erroneous ruling did not void the original parentage order for purposes of
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d), a statute that emphasizes finality).
70. See id. at 235 (reconciling Wisconsin law with federal law by noting that
federal courts often raise finality concerns and deny relief under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4) “where an erroneous legal conclusion forms the sole basis for the
request”).
71. See Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tex. App. 2007) (adhering
to the six month limit on appeals to final adoption orders and noting that all reasonable
efforts should be made to avoid the destruction of a parent-child relationship when it is
not in the best interests of the child).
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relationship with Castellanos had ended.”72 Similar reasoning should have
been employed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Boseman v.
Jarrell, due to the factual similarities between the two cases.73
In Boseman v. Jarrell, Melissa Jarrell pursued a jurisdictional challenge
that struck at the legitimacy of the adoption after her relationship with Julia
Boseman ended because she realized that it was the only way to challenge
the adoption without violating the statute of limitations on adoption
appeals.74 North Carolina’s supreme court should have acted as the Texas
court did in Goodson v. Castellanos by utilizing judicial estoppel to prevent
Jarrell from using the court system to achieve the nullification of an
adoption she had earlier actively pursued.75 There is no evidence in the
court’s opinion in Boseman that it considered or distinguished the rulings
issued by other state courts regarding subject matter jurisdictional
challenges to second-parent adoptions.76
Although a court certainly strives to interpret law and policy to the best
of its ability, the importance of the finality of the judgment outweighs a
court’s potentially erroneous ruling in matters relating to adoption, given
the significance of stability and security for children and families.77 In both
the Wisconsin and Texas decisions, the courts held or assumed that the
lower courts had erred as a matter of law in granting the parentage rights at
issue, but left lower courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over adoption
proceedings and the adoptions themselves intact.78 The Supreme Court of
North Carolina should have followed their lead in Boseman v. Jarrell by
affirming the ruling of the court of appeals below in recognition of the
lower court’s broad grant of general jurisdiction and out of deference to the
72. See id. at 752 (admonishing the final adoption challenge).
73. Compare id. (prohibiting the final adoption challenge as not appealable due to

statutory limits), with Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d 494, 501 (N.C. 2010) (rejecting
Boseman’s argument that statutory limits barred any contest of the legality of the
adoption decree because a legal nullity may be challenged at any time).
74. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 501 (finding that the statute of limitations on
adoption appeals in North Carolina does not preclude challenges to a court’s subject
matter jurisdiction because a void judgment has no legal effect).
75. See Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 752 (disallowing Goodson’s challenge to the
lower court’s subject matter jurisdiction to preside over a second-parent adoption and
noting that Goodson was a willing participant in the adoption until her relationship with
her partner ended).
76. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 498-501 (citing only North Carolina precedents).
77. See, e.g., Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 749 (noting that the short appeals timeframe
was adopted in order to comport with the state’s public policy to provide a safe, stable,
and nonviolent home for children).
78. See In re Paternity of Christian R.H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Wis. Ct. App.
2010) (holding that although the lower court erred, the error did not void the court’s
decision); Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 748 (assuming without deciding that the lower
court erred as a matter of substantive law, yet maintaining that such error would not
deprive the lower court of jurisdiction or render the judgment void).
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legislature’s preference for finality in adoption proceedings.79
C. The Supreme Court of North Carolina Erred by Ignoring the Legislative
Intent and Proper Statutory Construction of the State’s Adoption Statutes
Because the Court Refused to Consider the Statutes’ Overarching Goals of
Stability, Finality, and the Best Interests of the Child.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s ultimate goal in statutory
interpretation and construction is to ensure that the legislature’s intent is
furthered, not undermined; yet in Boseman v. Jarrell there is little evidence
that the court considered the state adoption statutes’ overarching goals of
stability, finality, and the best interests of the child.80 The court is
obligated to consider the underlying policy considerations of a statute and
guarantee that a statutory analysis does not frustrate the statute’s ultimate
reason and purpose; yet there is no evidence that in Boseman v. Jarrell the
Supreme Court of North Carolina respected and adhered to its role in that
regard.81
By ignoring key statutory provisions of the state’s adoption statute—
namely section 48-1-100, regarding legislative findings and intent, and
section 48-2-607(a), regarding the finality of adoptions—and instead
focusing on a narrow interpretation of the state’s direct placement adoption
requirements, the state supreme court failed to recognize the North
Carolina legislature’s intent to prioritize finality and stability for children
over correcting errors made by trial courts.82 The statutory language
describing the purpose of adoption clearly shows that the legislature’s

79. See Boseman I, 681 S.E.2d 374, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the
adoption court acted within its jurisdictional bounds, and holding that, at most, the
grant of direct placement adoption in this case was an error of law), aff’d in part as
modified, rev’d in part, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010).
80. Compare Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 502 (recognizing but refusing to address
the myriad policy arguments raised by Boseman and amici regarding a broad
interpretation of the statute), with Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 403
S.E.2d 291, 294 (N.C. 1991) (discerning the legislative intent of a specific statute
before turning to the facts of the case at hand (citing Hunt v. Reinsurance Facility 275
S.E.2d 399, 405 (N.C. 1981))).
81. See Campbell v. First Baptist Church of the City of Durham, 259 S.E.2d 558,
564 (N.C. 1979) (explaining that a court should always construe a statute in a manner
that will protect its intent from circumvention by making sure that the “ills that
prompted the statute’s passage [are] redressed”); In re Hardy, 240 S.E.2d 367, 372
(N.C. 1978) (noting the importance of interpreting a statute’s plain language in a way
that harmonizes with its underlying purpose).
82. Compare Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 501 (denying the possibility of a
modification to direct placement adoption by finding that the General Assembly
intended that the adoption decree had to sever the previous parent-child relationship),
with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-607(a) (2011) (“[A]fter a final order of adoption is
entered, no party to an adoption proceeding nor anyone claiming under such a party
may question the validity of the adoption because of any defect or irregularity,
jurisdictional or otherwise, in the proceeding, but shall be fully bound by the order.”).
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primary goal is consistency and security for minor children and that the
adopted child’s interests should be prioritized over the interests of any
adult.83 Further, the legislature emphasizes that the adoption statutes
should be liberally construed and applied to promote these overarching
goals.84 The lower court and the court of appeals that initially granted and
reviewed, respectively, the adoption at issue in Boseman v. Jarrell, adhered
to this statutory construction and legislative intent; yet, the state supreme
court chose to disregard the intended impact of the statute as a whole.85 By
voiding this second-parent adoption, the state supreme court frustrated the
objective of the statute and undermined the state legislature’s purpose in
creating it.86
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reached its decision to void the
adoption (rather than, at most, conclude that the lower court erred as a
matter of law) by holding that the adoption at issue failed to sever the
biological parent-child relationship as required by the statute governing
direct placement adoptions, and that by not severing biological parent-child
ties before completing the adoption, Boseman and Jarrell were granted an
adoption that was not statutorily available.87 The court failed to consider
that the primary reason for the requirement that a biological parent’s rights
be terminated before an adoption is completed is the legislature’s
expectation that the child will be placed in a new home with a new
family.88 This rationale becomes inappropriate when the biological parent
and the adoptive parent plan to raise the child together, and frustrates the
legislative goal of protecting and promoting the best interests of the child
by requiring that one parent’s rights be terminated to facilitate adoption by

83. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(b)(1) (2011) (noting the primary purpose of
adoption is to advance the welfare of minors by “protecting minors from unnecessary
separation from their original parents [and] facilitating the adoption of minors . . . by
persons who can give them love, care, security, and support”); see also id.
§ 48-1-100(c) (subjugating the interests of adults to children’s needs, interests, and
rights).
84. See id. § 48-1-100(d) (stating that the adoption statutes should be liberally
construed and used to promote the statutes’ underlying purposes and policies).
85. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 500 (holding that because the statutory language
is clear and unambiguous, courts do not have power to liberally construe the language).
86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100 (2011) (intending clearly and unambiguously
that the statute be used to promote stable and loving homes for minor children in the
state).
87. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 500 (concluding that because the legislature’s
language was “clear and unambiguous” in relation to the requirements for direct
placement adoptions, the court did not retain the ability to liberally construe the statute
as specified in § 48-1-100(d)).
88. See In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993) (finding that
the traditional termination of parental rights provision was in place because of the
anticipation that the adoption of children would remove them from the care of their
biological parents).
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a second parent.89 Promoting the best interests of the child as the
legislature intended would undoubtedly include assisting two capable
adults, instead of just one, to legally parent and provide for the child
throughout his or her life.90
Other state courts have rejected a strict interpretation of the provision
mandating termination of parental rights before an adoption can occur
when that interpretation would produce “an absurd outcome” that would
“nullify the advantage sought by the proposed adoption: the creation of a
legal family unit identical to the actual family setup”; the North Carolina
supreme court should have taken such language under consideration.91
Instead of prioritizing the needs and interests of the minor child, which
would certainly include maintaining legally binding ties to two parents
instead of one, the North Carolina supreme court accepted a collateral
attack to a final adoption decree and voided the adoption at issue, thereby
leaving the child in a more precarious financial and emotional position.92
Not only does this decision contradict the best interests of the child, but it
also contradicts the best practice, long recognized by North Carolina
courts, of construing adoption statutes broadly and liberally to further those
interests.93
When there are two possible ways of construing an adoption statute, as is
clearly possible given the differing opinions of the lower courts and the
state supreme court in Boseman v. Jarrell, a court should adopt a
construction that furthers, rather than undermines, the purpose of the
statute.94 To that end, the Supreme Court of North Carolina should have
followed the example of other state courts that have liberally construed
89. See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 10, at 1024-26 (positing that it is for this reason
that legislatures devised the specific stepparent exception to the requirement that
biological parental rights terminate upon adoption).
90. See Boseman I, 681 S.E.2d 374, 380-81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting the
state’s recognition of the importance of two legal parents dedicated to the long-term
well-being of a child), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C.
2010).
91. See In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1992)
(refusing to deny a second-parent adoption based on a strict construction of the statute
that would ultimately frustrate its purpose).
92. But see Boseman I, 681 S.E.2d at 380-81 (citing the importance of having two
parents dedicated to the emotional and financial well-being of a child, and the state’s
interest in maintaining those legal ties).
93. See Locke v. Merrick, 28 S.E.2d 523, 527 (N.C. 1944) (noting that adoption not
only benefits those immediately impacted but also the public, and therefore the statute
should not be construed technically, “nor compliance . . . examined with a judicial
microscope” (quoting Carter Oil Co. v. Norman, 131 F.2d 451 (1942))).
94. See, e.g., Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Nags Head,
265 S.E.2d 379, 385 (N.C. 1980) (declaring that the best way to determine the purpose
of the statute and legislative intent is to examine the language of the statute, its spirit,
and what it seeks to accomplish (citing Stevenson v. City of Durham, 188 S.E.2d 281
(N.C. 1972))).
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adoption statutes to allow for second-parent adoptions that are not
otherwise specifically identified in the statutes.95 Those courts cited the
legislative intent and purpose of adoption statutes in deciding to uphold
such an adoption decree, and the North Carolina supreme court should have
followed suit.96 In employing reasoning similar to the Supreme Court of
Iowa in Schott v. Schott, the Supreme Court of North Carolina could have
acted to further the intent of the legislature and protect the interests of
adopted children rather than narrowly and mechanically applying the exact
language of a statutory subsection.97 North Carolina’s adoption statutes are
not substantively dissimilar from those in other states, and no such different
and drastic result was warranted in Boseman v. Jarrell.98
Ignoring well-reasoned statutory interpretations from other states as well
as its own, the North Carolina supreme court read the state adoption
statutes to exclude second-parent adoptions.99 In doing so, the court
destabilized the life of the little boy at the center of the controversy in
Boseman v. Jarrell and further jeopardized the security and stability of the
children in North Carolina who have been adopted via this mechanism in
the past.100 The Supreme Court of North Carolina should have decided, as
have courts in other jurisdictions, that second-parent adoptions, although
not specifically conceived of in the state’s adoption statutes, furthered the
intentions of the legislature to advance the welfare of minors.101 In holding
otherwise, the court neglected its responsibility to advance legislative
95. See, e.g., Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 748-49 (Tex. App. 2007)
(noting that all reasonable efforts to prevent destruction of a parent-child relationship is
in the best interests of the child); Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa 2008)
(emphasizing the importance of stability for children and finality of judgments for
families).
96. See, e.g., Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 749 (holding that legislative intent precluded
untimely appeals to adoption decrees because of the possible trauma to children and
families that results from the destruction of a parent-child relationship created by
adoption).
97. See Schott, 744 N.W.2d at 88 (allowing a district court’s original grant of
second-parent adoption to stand, despite the fact that second-parent adoptions are not
conceived of in the state’s statutes, because the adoption statute contained language
that it was to be “construed liberally” to promote the best interests of the child).
98. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-106 (2011) (noting that the decree of
adoption severs the relationship between biological parent and child, with an exception
for a stepparent adoption), with IOWA CODE § 600.3 (2011) (noting that an adoption
may not be filed until parental rights have been terminated, with a few narrow
exceptions not including second-parent adoption).
99. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d 494, 498, 501 (N.C. 2010) (overruling the lower
court’s decision that the adoption at issue comported with the “intent and purposes of
both our adoption law as a whole and the specific provisions of it at issue here”).
100. See id. at 509-10 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (finding the majority failed to protect
the best interests of adoptees by neglecting guidance explicitly stated in the legislative
priorities).
101. See, e.g., Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 749 (emphasizing the importance of stability
and finality for children).
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objectives and protect North Carolina families and children.102
D. The North Carolina General Assembly Should Repudiate the Supreme
Court’s Ruling in Boseman v. Jarrell by Amending the State’s Adoption
Statutes to Specifically Include Second-Parent Adoptions Because It Is in
Keeping with the Best Interests of the Child Standard.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s ruling in Boseman v. Jarrell
defied proper statutory construction and legislative intent; thus, the state’s
statutes warrant legislative amendment to clarify the meaning and purpose
of adoption and to protect the best interests of children.103 Because
adoption is a statutory creation, the legislature is a fitting place for adoption
reform and expansion.104 The North Carolina supreme court routinely
deflects policy decisions to the legislature out of deference, calling it a
body better equipped to “weigh all the factors surrounding a particular
problem, balance competing interests, provide an appropriate forum for a
full and open debate, and address all of the issues at one time.”105 Further,
a legislature can act to repudiate court decisions that it finds contrary to the
interpreted law’s purpose and intent by explicitly amending statutory
language to overrule, in effect, the court’s decision.106
Although arguments made previously in this Comment note that the state
supreme court could have and should have maintained the adoption in
Boseman v. Jarrell on various grounds, it instead voided it, leaving the
issues of second-parent adoption and jurisdiction over adoption
proceedings open for General Assembly action.107 The General Assembly
should accept this challenge to act by explicitly amending the state’s
adoption statutes to clarify the lower courts’ ability to decide all adoption
102. But see Boseman I, 681 S.E.2d 374, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding the
adoption, citing the best interests of the child and the legislature’s directive that
adoption statutes be liberally construed to that end), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in
part, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010).
103. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 509-10 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority failed to protect the best interests of minor adoptees by neglecting guidance
explicitly stated in the legislative priorities).
104. See, e.g., In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2002) (noting
that adoption is unknown at common law, and is rather a creature of statute).
105. See Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 8 (N.C. 2004) (finding the General
Assembly better situated to make policy than the state supreme court).
106. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(finding that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), “significantly impairs statutory protection against
discrimination”); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (noting
the purpose of the Act was, in part, to change Supreme Court rulings on employment
discrimination).
107. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 548-49 (“[U]ntil the legislature changes the
provisions of Chapter 48, we must recognize the statutory limitations on adoption
decrees that may be entered.”).
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matters and further protect children and families by unambiguously
allowing second-parent adoptions.108
By emphasizing in new statutory language that the lower courts retain
jurisdiction over adoption matters in all cases that meet the minimum
residency requirements, including those adoptions not specifically
conceived of in the statutes, the General Assembly would resuscitate the
trial court’s role as the appropriate arbiter of the best interests of the
children involved in adoptions.109 Because lower courts are closest to the
facts and circumstances of the cases at issue, these courts are the best
places for determining whether the particularities of a proposed adoption
meet the statutory requirements and further the primary legislative purpose
of advancing the welfare of minors.110 An amendment of this nature would
allow lower courts the latitude to decide cases based on the best interests of
the child, with an understanding that an overreach outside statutory bounds
would equate to an error of law, reversible upon appeal.111
Further, an explicit amendment allowing second-parent adoption would
promote the legislature’s intent that adoption should promote the best
interests of the child and would protect the hundreds of children in the state
who have already been adopted via this mechanism.112 In clarifying the
language of the statute to explicitly allow for second-parent adoptions, the
legislature would be acting in the best interests of the child by protecting
their financial and emotional benefits, including the provision of Social
Security and life insurance benefits to the child in the event of a parent’s
death or disability, the right to inherit under laws of intestacy, the right to
108. See, e.g., Plowman, supra note 29, at 77 (positing that because adoption is a
purely statutory construction, the legislature is a natural setting for adoption reform).
109. See, e.g., In re D.R.F., 693 S.E.2d 235, 238 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that a
trial court’s decision regarding the best interests of the child is discretionary and will be
overturned only upon a showing that it was “so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision” (citing White v. White, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (N.C.
1985))).
110. See Smithwick v. Frame, 303 S.E.2d 217, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(concluding that it is the trial court’s job to determine the ultimate facts of the case,
meaning that a trial court must weave together evidentiary findings and conclusions of
law (citing Woodward v. Mordecai, 67 S.E.2d 639 (N.C. 1951))); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-1-100(b)(1) (2011) (prioritizing the well-being of children in adoption
proceedings).
111. See, e.g., In re Paternity of Christian R. H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 231-33 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2010) (demonstrating the security of a trial court’s ability to decide adoption
cases and the ability of a reviewing court to overturn as an error of law if timely
appealed).
112. See Leslie M. Fenton & Ann Fenton, The Changing Landscape of SecondParent Adoptions, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS LITIG. (Am. Bar Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), Oct.
25, 2011, at 8, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/childrights-fall2011.authcheckdam.pdf (quoting an estimate that more
than 200 families have been granted second-parent adoptions in North Carolina and are
vulnerable after the supreme court’s decision in Boseman v. Jarrell).
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sue for wrongful death of a parent, and eligibility for health insurance
coverage under both parents’ health insurance policies.113
The General Assembly should amend the adoption statutes to include
second-parent adoption and make clear that it is doing so in an effort to
further the best interests of the child.114 In a different opinion, a Wisconsin
Supreme Court justice supported the legislature’s role in expanding
adoption statutes to include second-parent adoption by using the best
interests of the child standard:
Hopefully our legislators will continue to work to advance the interests
and protection of our children by listening to their constituents,
reviewing our current laws, and debating the wisdom of statutory
changes. Children cannot protect their own interests. The legislature
can protect those interests by vigilantly overseeing the children’s code
and ensuring a statutory scheme that indeed provides for the best
interests of our kids.115

By amending the current adoption statutes, the General Assembly would
clarify that state courts with jurisdiction over adoption proceedings are best
positioned to determine whether a placement is in the best interests of the
child, and would provide them with the statutory justification to make those
determinations, regardless of the marital status or familial relationship of
the adopting parties.116 A second-parent adoption amendment would serve
both the financial and emotional best interests of the child and would offer
legal recognition and security to a child’s relationship with a person that
the child recognizes as a parent, whether the law does or not.117
A second-parent adoption amendment to North Carolina’s adoption
statutes would allow the General Assembly to determine the precise scope
of such an amendment and provide explicit guidance for lower courts going
forward.118 An amendment with a narrower scope would remedy the
113. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) (noting the numerous
benefits to a child when his legal ties to two parents are solidified via second-parent
adoption).
114. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Love: The Child’s Fundamental
Right to Adoption, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 297, 324 (2005) (recognizing states’ gradual
movement away from limitations on who may adopt and broadening the base of
prospective parents to better serve the best interests of the child).
115. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 687 (Wis. 1994) (Geske, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that the legislature rather than the court is the proper forum to
change adoption policy but urging the legislature to take up the matter in the best
interests of the child).
116. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(3) (2011) (allowing the parent of a child
to authorize another person who shares parental responsibility to adopt the child).
117. See Elrod, A Child’s Perspective, supra note 43, at 249-51 (observing that
attachment between a child and parent forms early and is dependent on the quality and
nature of the interaction between them, rather than the legal designation of the parent).
118. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(3) (allowing the parent of a child to
authorize another person who shares parental responsibility to adopt the child), with
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situation at issue in Boseman v. Jarrell, allowing a parent’s partner to adopt
that parent’s biological child regardless of their marital status.119
Alternatively, an amendment with a more expansive scope would allow for
the adoption of children with one parent by anyone who shares in the
responsibility of parenting.120 Whether narrow or expansive in scope, a
second-parent adoption amendment would expand options for heterosexual
couples who are not married as well as gay and lesbian couples who cannot
marry, and it would reflect the legislature’s acknowledgment of societal
shifts that have created different types of families with children no less
deserving of two legal parents, and no less deserving of a legal system that
promotes and preserves their best interests.121
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Although the Supreme Court of North Carolina should be commended
for its decision in Boseman v. Jarrell to maintain Julia Boseman’s custodial
relationship to her former son, Jacob, the court’s decision voiding
Boseman’s legal adoption of Jacob establishes a dangerous precedent and,
as stated above, should be overturned by legislative action.122 Such action
would not only further the best interests of the child, but would also be in
the best interests of society at large, because when children are afforded
two parents rather than one, the risk of their financial vulnerability and
possible dependence on the state is decreased.123
The General Assembly’s approval of second-parent adoptions in
furtherance of the best interests of the child should be grounded in explicit
and well-researched findings that gay parents are equally as capable of
providing loving homes, stability, and security for adopted children as their
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (West 2010) (allowing the partner of a parent to
adopt the child of the parent if that adoption is in the best interests of the child).
119. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (indicating that termination of a
parent’s parental rights in an adoption pursuant to this subsection).
120. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-203(1)(d.5)(I) (West 2011)
(expanding the parameters of when a child may be adopted to include second-parent
adoption when the child has one legal parent).
121. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW
FAMILIES 66 (2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pewsocial-trends-2010-families.pdf (noting that the number of cohabiting couples has more
than doubled since 1990, the first year that such a designation was available by the U.S.
Census).
122. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d 494, 551 (N.C. 2010) (holding that Boseman
retained custody rights because Jarrell voluntarily ceded decision-making authority to
her).
123. See Locke v. Merrick, 28 S.E.2d 523, 527 (N.C. 1944) (finding that adoption
benefits both the parties at issue and the public (citing Carter Oil Co. v. Norman, 131
F.2d 451 (1942))); see also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1983) (recognizing a
state’s legitimate interest in lowering the number of children on welfare and protecting
state revenue).
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heterosexual counterparts.124 Grounding a potential second-parent adoption
amendment in the research and opinions of well-regarded and reputable
sources, the sponsors and supporters of such an amendment will be better
situated to address potential counter-arguments and resistance from
members of the General Assembly wary of such an amendment out of
misguided and misinformed concern for the best interests of the children at
issue.125
A statutory amendment explicitly permitting second-parent adoption
would make clear to state courts and the general population that the state
values family stability and financial and emotional support for children,
regardless of the sexual orientation of their parents.126 The North Carolina
General Assembly should act in the upcoming legislative session to restore
the broad jurisdiction of lower courts to determine adoption cases and
affirm the right of a non-biological parent to a secure, stable legal
relationship with his or her adopted child.127
V. CONCLUSION
In Boseman v. Jarrell, the Supreme Court of North Carolina erred in
stripping lower courts of subject matter jurisdiction to decide second-parent
adoption cases, and the North Carolina General Assembly should thus act
to clarify its adoption statutes and restore the lower courts’ ability to decide
all adoption cases.128 Because the grant of a second-parent adoption in
North Carolina should amount, at most, to an error of law, the state
supreme court overstepped its bounds in limiting the jurisdiction of the
lower courts to determine adoption cases by reading in additional
jurisdictional requirements not required by statute.129 The Supreme Court
124. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n & Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers as
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee, Boseman v. Jarrell, 690 S.E.2d 530 (N.C.
2010) (No. 416PA08-2), at *1 (displaying empirical research that concludes lesbian
and gay parents do not differ from heterosexuals in their parenting skills and that
children raised by gay and lesbian parents do not show deficits as compared to children
raised by heterosexual parents).
125. See Ellen C. Perrin et al., Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent
Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341, 341-43 (2002) (finding that
parents’ sexual orientation is not a variable that, in itself, predicts an ability to provide
a home environment that is optimal for raising a child).
126. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(3) (2011) (reversing and superseding In
re Adoption of Baby Z., 247 Conn. 474 (1998), because the legislature wished to
expand adoption availability to same-sex couples).
127. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 687 (Wis. 1994) (Geske, J.,
concurring) (urging the legislature to determine whether second-parent adoption would
further the best interests of the child).
128. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505-06 (N.C. 2010) (Hudson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority opinion fashions, erroneously, an entirely new formulation of
what it means for a lower court to have subject matter jurisdiction).
129. See Ellis v. Ellis, 130 S.E. 7, 9 (N.C. 1925) (noting that when a court has
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of North Carolina should have considered other state courts’ second-parent
adoption precedents before charting new and dangerous territory that
revoked a lower court’s power to grant an adoption and deprived a child of
the benefit of two legal parents.130 Such consideration is warranted when a
state court considers ruling contrary to all other states’ decisions on a
similar matter.131
Further, by interpreting the state adoption statute without consideration
for the adoption statute’s overall purpose and intent, the state supreme
court employed myopic vision to void a final adoption that was otherwise
in the best interests of the child involved.132 The court has an obligation to
further, not undermine, the legislature’s intent to promote adoptions in the
best interests of children, and in Boseman v. Jarrell, there is scant evidence
that the court appreciated its role in that regard.133 As a result, the General
Assembly has an obligation to step in and amend the state’s adoption
statutes to ensure security and stability for all adopted children in North
Carolina.134

jurisdiction over the subject before it, the judgment is not void if it is merely in error).
130. See, e.g., Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. App. 2007)
(holding that even if the lower court erred as a matter of law in granting the secondparent adoption, the lower court maintained subject matter jurisdiction over the case
and the adoption was final for lack of a timely appeal).
131. See State v. Warren, 114 S.E.2d 660, 666 (N.C. 1960) (highlighting that while
North Carolina courts are not bound by decisions in other states, if many other state
courts had decided the same issue, their judgments should be considered “highly
persuasive”).
132. See Boseman II, 704 S.E.2d at 509 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (noting that the
majority’s opinion disregards the statutory directive that it be interpreted in a manner
that guarantees that the “needs, interests and rights of minor adoptees are primary”
(quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(c) (2011))).
133. See In re Hardy, 240 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (N.C. 1978) (emphasizing the
importance of interpreting the plain language of the statute in a way that incorporates
the underlying purpose of the statute).
134. See Plowman, supra note 29, at 77 (noting the appropriate fit of the legislature
as the place for adoption reform).
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